The Intelligent Eye
By R. Gregory. 1971
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Yoshua Bengio
- Jitendra Malik
- Trevor Darrell
- Sergey Levine
- Luc Van Gool
- Kaiming He
- Dacheng Tao
- J. Urgen Schmidhuber
Citations in the corpus
- On the Binding Problem in Artificial Neural Networks (2020, background): “Em er ge nc e Re ifi ca tio n M ul tis ta bi lit y In va ria nc e Figure 22: Emergence: At first encounter this image (a reproduction of the classic image from Gregory 1970) is perceived as an unstructured collection of black patches on white background.”
- THE DEVELOPMENT OF OBJECT CATEGORIZATION IN YOUNG CHILDREN: HIERARCHICAL INCLUSIVENESS, AGE, PERCEPTUAL ATTRIBUTE, AND GROUP VERSUS INDIVIDUAL ANALYSES (2010, background): “Gibson, 1979) or double reality (Gregory, 1970; see also Langer, 1942; Saussaure, 1959): To understand the symbolic nature of a model requires simultaneously acknowledging both its physical existence and its representational aspect.”
- The Origins of Pictorial Competence (2003, background): “A long-standing debate in psychology and other fields has centered on the degree to which experience is necessary to perceive and understand pictures: Do infants and young children look at pictures with an innocent eye (Gombrich, 1969) or with an intelligent eye (Gregory, 1970)? In other words, do c”
- Generative Adversarial Transformers (2021, background): “together to form the whole [27, 28], and the top-down processing, where surrounding context, selective attention and prior knowledge inform the interpretation of the particular [32, 68].”
- Amortized Inference in Probabilistic Reasoning (2014, background): “Consider, for example, the image in Figure 1 (Gregory, 1970).”
- Redundancy reduction revisited (2001, background): “The lesson from this is that we should be thinking how perceptual mechanisms form probability estimates, how probabilities are represented in the brain and how they are transmitted from place to place in it. This is not a new idea (see Helmholtz 1925, Barlow 1969, Gregory 1970 ) but we defer accept”
- RECOVERING INTRINSIC SCENE CHARACTERISTICS FROM IMAGES (1978, background): “Of course, it is possible to construct (or occasionally to encounter) scenes in which the obvious assumptions are incorrect -- for example, an Ames roon (see [ 13 ] for an illustration).”
- Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account (2001, background): “” Although it is often remarked that the Capgras delusion usually concerns someone close to the patient, Ellis and de Pauw (1994, 320) note, “Clearly the [Capgras delusion] does involve the belief that some individuals have been replaced by doubles or robots. But these are not necessarily people in ”
- Grasping the Nature of Pictures (1998, background): “Gregory (1970) noted that “pictures are unique” in that “they are seen both as themselves and as some other thing” (p. 32).”
- The illusion of reality: a review and integration of psychological research on hallucinations. (1990, background): “In this respect, the illusion of reality experienced when hallucinating may be similar to the kinds of ordinary visual illusions with which most people are familiar (Gregory, 1970).”
- Nerfies: Deformable Neural Radiance Fields (2020, methodology): “Figure 11: If the user’s gaze consistently follows the camera, the reconstructed nerfie represents the user’s gaze as geometry, akin to the Hollow-Face illusion [20].”