A framework for quantitative security analysis of machine learning
By Pavel Laskov, Marius Kloft. 2009
76 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Safety, Robustness & Interpretability, Privacy & Security
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Safety, Robustness & Interpretability
- Battista Biggio
- Fabio Roli
- Giorgio Fumera
- Giorgio Giacinto
- Davide Maiorca
- Nicolas Papernot
- Bo Li
- Blaine Nelson
In Privacy & Security
- Battista Biggio
- Fabio Roli
- Giorgio Giacinto
- Davide Maiorca
- Giorgio Fumera
- Pavel Laskov
- Blaine Nelson
- Xiaojin Zhu
Citations in the corpus
- Using Machine Teaching to Identify Optimal Training-Set Attacks on Machine Learners (2015, background): “Introduction The study on security threats to intelligent agents has a long history (Nelson et al. 2009; Tan, Killourhy, and Maxion 2002; Rubinstein et al. 2008; Barreno et al. 2010; Laskov and Lippmann 2010; Barreno et al. 2006; Dalvi et al. 2004; Liu and Chawla 2009; Biggio, Fumera, and Roli 2013;”
- Evasion Attacks against Machine Learning at Test Time (2013, background): “As suggested by Laskov and Kloft [17], the adversary’s goal should be defined in terms of a utility (loss) function that the adversary seeks to maximize (minimize).”
- Security Evaluation of Pattern Classifiers under Attack (2014, neutral): “F”
- Security Evaluation of Support Vector Machines in Adversarial Environments (2014, methodology): “Further, as suggested by Laskov and Kloft [42] and Kloft and Laskov [40], the adversary’s goal should be defined in terms of an objective function that the adversary is willing to maximize.”
- Security analysis of online centroid anomaly detection (2010, methodology): “The methodology of our analysis follows the following framework, which we believe can be used for a quantitative security analysis of learning algorithms (Laskov and Kloft, 2009): 1.”
- Data Poisoning Attacks against Autoregressive Models (2016, methodology): “The security ramifications of using machine learning models have long been studied (Barreno et al. 2006; 2010; Dalvi et al. 2004; Laskov and Kloft 2009; Tan, Killourhy, and Maxion 2002).”
- Attacks on Machine Learning: Lurking Danger for Accountability (2019, unknown): “Laskov and Kloft [38] propose a “framework for quantitative security analysis of ML models”.”
- Some Submodular Data-Poisoning Attacks on Machine Learners (2015, background): “The security community has long recognized the threats of data-poisoning attacks (a.k.a. causative attacks) on machine learning systems [1–6,9,10,12,16], where an attacker modifies the training data, so that the learning algorithm arrives at a “wrong” model that is useful to the attacker.”
- Behavior of Machine Learning Algorithms in Adversarial Environments (2010, background): “Laskov and Kloft [2009] have since extended these basic principles to propose a framework for quantitatively evaluating security threats.”
- Adversarial machine learning (2019, methodology): “In prior work [2], we introduced a qualitative taxonomy of attacks against a machine learning system, which has since been extended to propose a framework for quantitatively evaluating security threats [37].”
- The relationship between trust in AI and trustworthy machine learning technologies (2019, background): “Integrity can be enhanced by either preventing tampering, such as in pre-processing [73], or by discovering and possibly repairing tampered data [12, 14, 58].”
- Multiple classifier systems for robust classifier design in adversarial environments (2010, background): “Evaluating classifier robustness in adversarial classification tasks is a complex issue, which is outside the scope of this paper, and is the subject of an ongoing work [13,37], also by the authors.”
- Identifying Security Evaluation of PatternClassifiers Under attack (2015, background): “An intrinsic limitation of our work is that security evaluation is carried out empirically, and it is thus data dependent; on the other hand, model-driven analyses [12], [17], [38] require a full analytical model of the problem and of the adversary’s behavior, that may be very difficult to develop f”
- Detection of Adversarial Training Examples in Poisoning Attacks through Anomaly Detection (2018, background): “However, machine learning systems are vulnerable themselves [4]–[10], and can be targeted by attackers.”
- Detection of Malicious PDF Files Based on Hierarchical Document Structure (2013, methodology): “Given the increasing interest to the application of learning methods for security problems, some previous work has addressed the methodology for security analysis of learning algorithms [3, 18, 2].”
- Unsupervised Learning Trojan (2014, methodology): “The model also contemplates the adversary’s target system and the adversary’s capabilities in similar organizational manner as that of Laskov & Kloft (2009).”