Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-Owned Banks in Emerging Markets

By I. Dinç. 2005

1,232 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/45e97059c3cb5c752d19eda30bccbad9ec870d75

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Citations in the corpus

Bank Ownership and Credit Over the Business Cycle: Is Lending by State Banks Less Procyclical? (2012, background): “…(and vice versa), and whether public banks are rewarded for the low procyclicality of their lending by relatively small increases in 7 Similar results are obtained if we include an election variable to control for the impact of the electoral cycle on bank lending as in Dinc (2005) (unreported).”
State Ownership, Socio-political Factors, and Labor Cost Stickiness (2018, methodology): “For example, election years significantly increase state-owned banks’ lending in emerging countries, apparently to improve the electoral results for the ruling politicians (Dinc, 2005).”
Ownership, Institutions, and Capital Structure: Evidence from China (2009, background): “…ownership shows that while state ownership enhances firms’ access to debt, it has adverse effects on managerial incentives and firm performance (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Khwaja and Mian, 2005); and lending decisions of state-owned banks are politically motivated (Sapienza, 2004; Dinç, 2005).”
Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Geographic Ties (2007, background): “2These include Johnson and Mitton (2003) and Khwaja and Mian (2005) on preferential access to credit; Dinç (2005) on preferential treatment by government owned enterprises; Stigler (1971) and Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) on regulation; and Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) on government…”
Bank ownership, privatization, and performance: Evidence from a transition country (2013, background): “La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) argue that politicians may use government-owned banks to further their own political goals leading to lower subsequent economic growth, and Dinc (2005) provides evidence of political influences on lending and distributing rents.”
New Varieties of State Capitalism: Strategic and Governance Implications (2015, background): “For instance, in a study of emerging markets, Dinç (2005) found that during election years, state-owned banks generally lend more than private banks.”
Political Uncertainty and Accounting Conservatism (2013, positive): “31 Empirical evidence in the U.S. to support this view is limited (Drazen 2000), while studies in emerging markets show some evidence that governments take actions to improve chances of re-election (Brown and Dinc 2005; Dinc 2005).”
Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud (2014, background): “Suchadvantages includeaccess to key resources, including bank loans granted at favorable terms (Dinc 2005; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Khawaja andMian 2005), favorable tax treatment (Adhikari et al.”
Corporate governance and firm value during the global financial crisis: Evidence from China (2012, background): “The literature on state ownership shows that lending decisions of state-owned banks are politically motivated (Din, 2005; Sapienza, 2004).”
Economic Nationalism in Mergers and Acquisitions (2013, positive): “In an earlier version, we also studied the role of elections following Brown and Dinc (2005) and Dinc (2005) but did not find any statistically significant effect.”
The Cost of Political Connections (2018, neutral): “See, for example, Mian and Khwaja (2005), Cole (2009), Dinç and Gupta (2011), and Dinç (2005).”
Corruption, soundness of the banking sector, and economic growth: A cross-country study (2012, background): “Dinç (2005) shows that a bank’s lending behavior is affected by a politician’s influence using the loan data of government-owned banks around election years.”
Institutions, ownership structures, and distress resolution in China☆ (2013, background): “The prevalence of ‘soft lending’ practices in these markets (Allen et al., 2005; Dinc, 2005; La Porta et al., 2000) means that easy and cheap capital is readily available, which induces irresponsible budgeting and consequently distress (Lin et al., 2009).”
To what extent did the economic stimulus package influence bank lending and corporate investment decisions? Evidence from China (2018, background): “2 See http://www.businessinsider.com.au/chinas-excess-capacity-problem-2013-6 distorted with low efficiency due to political interventions (Dinc, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Sapienza, 2004), others argue that government lending can cure market failure and improve welfare by providing more capital…”
Committee Independence and Financial Institution Performance During the 2007–08 Credit Crunch: Evidence from a Multi‐Country Study (2011, background): “Governance practices determine the level of excessive risk-taking in financial firms (Dinc, 2005; Gorton & Rosen, 1995).”