Why Do Borrowers Pledge Collateral? New Empirical Evidence on the Role of Asymmetric Information
By Allen N. Berger, Marco A. Espinosa-Vega, W. Frame, Nathan H. Miller. 2011
222 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Management Information Systems
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/451df2b201cd45bf60bf74cc37f96ad3e9a29ded
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Steven R. G. Ongena
- Mauricio Larrain
- Geraldo Cerqueiro
- Jason Sturgess
- José María Liberti
- Kasper Roszbach
- C. Calomiris
- José-Luis Peydró
In Finance
- Geraldo Cerqueiro
- Steven R. G. Ongena
- Mauricio Larrain
- Jason Sturgess
- José María Liberti
- Kasper Roszbach
- C. Calomiris
- Allen N. Berger
In Management Information Systems
Citations in the corpus
- The Surprising Use of Credit Scoring in Small Business Lending by Community Banks and the Attendant Effects on Credit Availability, Risk, and Profitability (2011, unknown): “2005a) and reduced collateral requirements (Berger et al. 2010).”
- Collateralization, Bank Loan Rates and Monitoring (2016, background): “3 See Berger and Udell (1990, 1995), Harhoff and Körting (1998), Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), Lehmann and Neuberger (2001), Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina (2006), Agarwal and Hauswald (2010), Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou (2011), and Berger et al. (2011), among others.”
- How Collateral Laws Shape Lending and Sectoral Activity (2016, background): “…al. (2005), Jimenez et al. (2006), Gan (2007), Djankov et al. (2007), Ono and Uesugi (2009), Benmelech (2009), Benmelech and Bergman (2009, 2011), Berger et al. (2011, 2013), Godlewski and Weill (2011), Chaney et al. (2012), Rampini and Viswanathan (2013), Campello and Giambona (2013), and Mann…”