Regulating Bankers' Pay

By L. Bebchuk, Holger Spamann. 2009

382 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/448098b418c6a33aadb3581cee1700df1470a4d6

Citations in the corpus

• CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions (2011, unknown): “embedded in CEO compensation (see John et al., 2000; Bebchuk and Spamann, 2009), or of increases in the amount of deferred compensation.”
• Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers (2012, unknown): “For a review and discussion of bank incentives in the context of sub-prime lending, see also Bebchuk and Spamann (2010), Bebchuk et al. (2010) and Rajan (2010).”
• Corporate Governance: What’s Special About Banks? (2013, unknown): “However, although such measures could eliminate risktaking that is excessive from the shareholders’ point of view, they cannot be expected to prevent risk-taking that serves shareholders but is socially excessive (Bebchuk & Spamann 2010).”
• The Credit Crisis and the Moral Responsibility of Professionals in Finance (2011, unknown): “As Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) state, it refers to actions whose expected effect on bank value is negative.”
• Financial Expertise of the Board, Risk Taking, and Performance: Evidence from Bank Holding Companies (2014, unknown): “These results are consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2010) who study an international panel of large banks and find that pro-shareholder boards are associated with higher (lower) performance prior to (during) the crisis, potentially reflecting decisions that were thought to maximize shareholder va”
• Long-Run Trends in the Distribution of Income and Wealth (2014, unknown): “Freeman and Gelber (2006) 138 See Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) and Bebchuck and Spamann (2009) for overviews of performance based pay in the financial sector.”