Inspections, pollution prices, and environmental performance: evidence from China
By Susmita Dasgupta, B. Laplante, Nlandu Mamingi, Hua Wang. 2001
212 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4419d79786863bf752511fe5570fb2907214a868
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- M. Cole
- Robert J. R. Elliott
- Jay Shimshack
- Hua Wang
- Shanshan Wu
- Markus Kitzmueller
- Wayne B. Gray
- Rongbing Huang
In Strategy and Management
- Jay Shimshack
- Robert J. R. Elliott
- M. Cole
- Shanshan Wu
- Hua Wang
- Wayne B. Gray
- Rongbing Huang
- Danping Chen
Citations in the corpus
- Transboundary pollution in China: a study of polluting firms' location choices in Hebei province (2013, unknown): “Moreover, a higher number of inspections leads to a higher expected penalty for firms that do not comply with environmental standards and, thus, significantly reduces the level of water and air pollution of industries in the city of Zhenjiang (Dasgupta et al., 2001).”
- Does Environmental Information Disclosure Benefit Waste Discharge Reduction? Evidence from China (2014, background): “Command control is effective in pollutant discharge reduction (Lee 1999; Dasgupta et al. 2001).”
- Industrial Ownership and Environmental Performance: Evidence from China (2002, unknown): “However, a significant impact of inspection and an insignificant impact of pollution charge were found by Dasgupta et al. (2001) with a panel data of major polluters from one city in China.”
- Assessing the Impact of Formal and Informal Regulations on Environmental and Economic Performance of Brazilian Manufacturing Firms (2012, background): “This is in line with the previous finding by Dasgupta et al. (2001) and Seroa da Motta (2006) respectively for the Mexican and the Brazilian manufacturing industries.”
- The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence (2011, background): “Dasgupta et al. (2001) found that inspections of manufacturing facilities in Zhenjiang, China, reduced common water pollutants by between 0.4 and 1.2 percent and reduced air particulates by approximately 0.3 percent.”
- Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (2012, background): “A growing literature demonstrates that expanding formal regulations with extensive monitoring and enforcement drive environmental performance in transitional economies (Dasgupta et al. 2001; Liu 2009).”
- Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation: Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories (2002, background): “Using database of plants located all across China, Dasgupta et al. (1997) and Wang and Wheeler (2000) have shown that the actual collection of pollution levies is sensitive to differences in economic development and environmental quality: air and water pollution levies are higher in areas which are ”
- Water Pollution and the Textile Industry in Bangladesh: Flawed Corporate Practices or Restrictive Opportunities? (2019, background): “However, the available data is often quite limited in developed countries, and even more so in developing countries [16].”
- Industrial activity and the environment in China: An industry-level analysis (2008, methodology): “Following Gianessi et al. (1979), Pargal and Wheeler (1996) and Cole et al.”