Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking

By C. Matutes, Xavier Vives. 2000

539 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/436a63018f8dc43779359cb6a3861a9993df9851

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Citations in the corpus

Does Competition Reduce the Risk of Bank Failure (2010, background): “1 SeeKeeley(1990),Besanko and Thakor(1993),Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz(2000),Matutes and Vives (2000), andRepullo(2004), among others. c© The Author 2010.”
CHAPTER 14 – Competition and Regulation in Banking (2008, background): “Matutes and Vives (2000) examine the impact of deposit insurance on bank competition and risk taking incentives in a context where banks are subject to limited liability and their failure implies social costs.”
Efficiency and Risk in European Banking (2011, unknown): “…values coupled with the banks’ limited liability and the existence of ‘quasi’ flat rate deposit insurance could encourage banks to take on more risk (Matutes and Vives, 2000 and Salas and Saurina, 2003).4 Regulators have tried to counterbalance these possible incentives by giving capital…”
Market power and banking failures (2002, background): “In the real world, firms face both idiosyncratic 1See, for instance, Chan et al. (1992), and Matutes and Vives (1996, 2000).”
The impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings: A cross-country analysis (2006, background): “Matutes and Vives (2000) examine the welfare implications of banking competition under various deposit insurance regimes in a model of imperfect competition with social failure costs and where banks are subject to limited liability.”
Does Monetary Policy Affect Bank Risk-Taking? (2010, unknown): “The decline in charter value, coupled with the existence of limited liability and the application of flat rate deposit insurance, could encourage banks to take on more risk (Matutes and Vives, 2000).”