Market power and banking failures

By Ramon Caminal, C. Matutes. 2002

252 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1b28e25464f5f3fb53f48754a97d0954aa421b45

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Phil Molyneux
2. X. Fu
3. Ulrich Heimeshoff
4. Yongjia Lin
5. Elena Carletti
6. André Uhde
7. Yong Tan
8. Hong Liu

In Finance

1. Phil Molyneux
2. X. Fu
3. Ulrich Heimeshoff
4. Yongjia Lin
5. Elena Carletti
6. André Uhde
7. Yong Tan
8. Hong Liu

Citations in the corpus

• Banks without Parachutes – Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies (2010, unknown): “(8)See Koskela and Stenbacka (2000), Caminal and Matutes (2002), and Boyd and De Nicolò (2003). (9)See Hellman, Murdoch, and Stiglitz (2000), Perotti and Suarez (2002), and Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8.4). (10)In a similar vein, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) find that banks’ interest m”
• CHAPTER 14 – Competition and Regulation in Banking (2008, background): “This is formally shown by Caminal and Matutes (2002) in a model in which banks compete for loans and can use monitoring or credit rationing to deal with an entrepreneurial moral hazard problem.”
• Bank Competition and Financial Stability: Much Ado About Nothing? (2015, unknown): “Some theoretical studies reveal that banks in uncompetitive systems are more likely to originate risky loans, which pave the way to systemic vulnerabilities (Caminal and Matutes, 2002).”
• Banking stability determinants in Africa (2018, unknown): “Caminal and Matutes (2002) suggest that lower competition can lead to reduced credit rationing and larger loans, which can ultimately increase the probability of bank failure, hence greater bank instability.”
• Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: Empirical evidence (2008, background): “4 Concentration and Non-performing Loans In contrast to the idea that larger banks may raise asset quality by “credit rationing” as provided by advocates of the “concentration stability” view (see PETERSEN and RAJAN; 1995; CAMINAL and MATUTES, 2002), regression (4) indicates a statistically signific”
• Are More Competitive Banking Systems More Stable (2006, unknown): “Others take a diametrically opposite view and argue that banks in uncompetitive, monopolistic markets with intermediate monitoring costs are prone to originate risky loans that set the stage for subsequent problems in the system (Caminal and Matutes, 2002).”
• Bank Market Power and SME Financing Constraints (2009, unknown): “Another theoretical model suggests that the impact of competition involves a trade-off between the borrower’s incentive problem and higher monitoring effort and that when the second effect dominates it is optimal for banks to have some market power ( Caminal and Matutes, 2002 ).”