On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings

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How researchers see this paper

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A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets (2016, unknown): “Another related strand of the literature imposes conditions on preferences to guarantee uniqueness of a stable matching in a given finite economy (Eeckhout 2000; Clark 2006; Niederle and Yariv 2009).”
Why Dowry Payments Declined with Modernization in Europe but Are Rising in India (2003, unknown): “28 Another way dowry payments can fall is if women start to have value in the marriage market.”
The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings (2006, background): “Then there is a unique stable matching in which mi is matched with wi, for all i (Theorem 1 in Eeckhout, 2000).”
Pricing of parking games with atomic players (2015, unknown): “Our proof is built upon the sufficient condition for the uniqueness of stable marriage matching proposed by Eeckhout (2000). With the ordered sets ( , i 1, i, i + 1, ) and ( , j 1, j, j + 1, ) where ti,j < tk,j, "i = j, k > i, a price vector p can be constructed to ensure ei,j + pj < ei,l + pl for "”