Boondoggles, Rent-Seeking, and Political Checks and Balances: Public Investment under Unaccountable Governments

By Philip E. Keefer, Stephen F. Knack. Review of Economics and Statistics, 2007

275 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4295b55b7ffaecbf666d79671883b6e37b9e52f0

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Citations in the corpus

Institutions, Foreign Direct Investment, and Domestic Investment: Crowding Out or Crowding In? (2016, background): “4 Alternatively, Keefer and Knack (2007) do not exclude the possibility that public investment is higher in countries with weak institutions because government seeks to compensate for poor investment climate.”
Oil Rents, Corruption, and State Stability: Evidence from Panel Data Regressions (2011, background): “8 Interestingly, we find that stronger checks and balances have an individually positive effect on corruption, significantly reducing corruption levels as documented for instance by Keefer and Knack (2007).”
Public Investment in Developing Countries: A Blessing or a Curse? (2008, background): “Keefer and Knack (2007) find that public investment is significantly higher in countries with bad institutions, which they argue is a reflection of the enhanced rent-seeking incentives of governments in environments where property rights are less secure.”
Boom-Bust Cycle, Asymmetrical Fiscal Response and the Dutch Disease (2010, background): “…however, that the effectiveness of those fiscal institutions relies crucially on the ability of governments in resource rich countries to design and put in place checks and balances to prevent rent seeking (see Keefer and Knack (2007)) and limit creative accounting (see Milesi-Ferretti (2003)).”
Investing in public investment: an index of public investment efficiency (2012, unknown): “In contrast, findings are less robust among studies that use public investment flows or their cumulative value (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Keefer and Knack, 2007).”
Infrastructure, growth, and inequality : an overview (2014, background): “…public capital expenditure and the accumulation of infrastructure assets or the provision of services – which is what really matters for growth and equity -- may be weak or nonexistent, owing to inefficiencies in public procurement and outright corruption (Pritchett 2000, Keefer and Knack 2007).”
Public capital in resource rich economies: is there a curse? (2014, background): “In a related paper Keefer and Knack (2007) deal with the political economy of public investments.”
Infrastructure and Income Distribution in ASEAN-5: What are the Links? (2013, background): “Indeed, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Keefer and Knack (2007) found that weaker governance is associated with higher investment to GDP ratios.”
What Determines Public Expenditure Allocations? A Review of Theories, and Implications for Agricultural Public Investment (2012, background): “Keefer and Knack (2007) determine that measures of poorer political governance, proxied by governance indexes drawn from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the Database of Political Institutions, increase aggregate public investments.”
Buying votes vs. supplying public services : political incentives to under-invest in pro-poor policies (2013, background): “Roads or infrastructure projects, are also useful comparators to health services because they have been described as particularly amenable to elite and political capture in the Philippines and elsewhere (Matsuda and Cruz, 2012; Keefer and Knack, 2007; Khemani, 2012).”