Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy

By Hongbin Cai, D. Treisman. 2005

311 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/426b405856ad505ef854d6daa981bb43b0932bfe

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. P. Bardhan
2. Dilip Mookherjee
3. Xiaobo Lü
4. Xuejun Du
5. Zhonghua Huang
6. Erik Wibbels
7. P. Landry
8. Ben Lockwood

In Economics and Econometrics

1. P. Bardhan
2. Dilip Mookherjee
3. Xiaobo Lü
4. Xuejun Du
5. Zhonghua Huang
6. Erik Wibbels
7. P. Landry
8. Brian Min

In Political Science and International Relations

1. P. Bardhan
2. Dilip Mookherjee
3. Xiaobo Lü
4. Xuejun Du
5. Zhonghua Huang
6. Erik Wibbels
7. P. Landry
8. Brian Min

Citations in the corpus

• MADISON IN BAGHDAD?: Decentralization and Federalism in Comparative Politics (2006, background): “In an important recent paper, Cai & Treisman (2005) show that when there is significant divergence in initial endowments across regions, open markets actually encourage economically inefficient behavior rather than market-friendly competition on the part of poor regions.”
• Government intervention and land misallocation: Evidence from China (2017, background): “China's regional decentralization reform has greatly motivated local governments to compete hard for outside investments and promote business development in their jurisdictions (Jin, Qian, & Weingast, 2005; Cai & Treisman, 2005).”
• International Tax Competition and Coordination (2014, unknown): “Empirically, asymmetric equilibra in which one country or region chooses a high-tax strategy and extracts from the existing immobile capital base and the other country or countries compete for new investments in Russia has been the motivation for the analysis by Cai and Treisman (2005) who study thi”
• Show Me the Money: Interjurisdiction Political Competition and Fiscal Extraction in China (2014, methodology): “Cai and Treisman (2005) argue that heterogeneity in regional endowment reduces the intensity of competition for mobile capital.”
• Decentralization, Corruption And Government Accountability: An Overview (2005, background): “Cai and Treisman (2004b) point out that the argument for benign effects of competition depends on the implicit assumption of the homogeneity of jurisdictions with regard to the productivity of the factors concerned.”