Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes
By Ted O’Donoghue, Matthew Rabin. 2003
433 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/416271144c4a320673168e9c0ca5ff37fd6162df
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Cameron Hepburn
- George Loewenstein
- B. Kőszegi
- Phoebe Koundouri
- B. Groom
- Maria Börjesson
- Jonas Eliasson
- Jonathan Gruber
In General Decision Sciences
- George Loewenstein
- B. Kőszegi
- Jonathan Gruber
- Cameron Hepburn
- N. Chater
- Jonas Eliasson
- Jukka Pirttilä
- Ravi Kanbur
Citations in the corpus
- Declining Discount Rates: The Long and the Short of it (2005, background): “Recent work on sin taxes by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) provides an example of this type of approach.”
- Putting nudges in perspective (2017, background): “Or consider Cell G, in which there is a behavioural economic rationale for an intervention, but the type of intervention is of the traditional economic variety (see O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2003, 2006, for a discussion of this situation).”
- Tax incidence when individuals are time-inconsistent: the case of cigarette excise taxes (2004, background): “More generally, as emphasized by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003), the extra discount factor b that each self applies to the future is only relevant for that single self, so ignoring it when evaluating the agent’s overall welfare may be justified.”
- Non-Welfarist Optimal Taxation and Behavioral Public Economics (2006, positive): “We can capture some of the arguments developed by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) in the present, general, framework.”
- The value of time and external benefits in bicycle appraisal (2012, background): “A particularly relevant discussion is the literature on “sin taxes” (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2006, 2003), where optimal policy rules are derived for situations where consumers do not have full information or self-control, and hence may act against their own best self-interest.”