Simulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem

By J. Eyckmans, Henry Tulkens. 2003

224 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges (2008, methodology): “The analysis of the link between environmental and some other policy issues in order to improve the prospects of IEAs has been initiated by Folmer et al. (1993) and Folmer and van Mouche (1994) in the context of compliance models.”
A recursive core for partition function form games (2006, background): “Examples include trade blocks (Yi, 1996), common pool resource games (Funaki and Yamato, 1999), and international environmental agreements (Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2003).”
Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game (2006, unknown): “For the calibration of the model, we rely on damage cost estimates of Fankhauser (1995) and Tol (1997) and abatement cost estimates of Ellerman and Decaux (1998).”
Dynamic Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution (2009, methodology): “Eyckmans and Tulkens [66] and Labriet and Loulou [137] use large-scale models.”