Real options and preemption under incomplete information

By B. Lambrecht, W. Perraudin. 2003

306 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3f545ea91982c5b071093f036322964babec6026

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Citations in the corpus

Investment and Competition (2006, unknown): “For instance, Williams (1993), Baldursson (1998), Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998), Grenadier (1996, 2002), and Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) all show that the value of certain real options quickly erodes when investment opportunities are contestable.”
The Dynamics of Mergers and Acquisitions (2005, unknown): “This is similar in spirit to the analysis in Grenadier (1999) and Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) where agents infer the private information of other agents through their observed exercise strategies.”
R&D Investments with Competitive Interactions (2004, background): “Grenadier (1999) and Lambrecht and Perraudin (1999) introduce asymmetric information issues in the competitive exercise of options to invest.”
Irreversible investment in alternative projects (2006, methodology): “complex way with the real options considerations emphasized in this paper (see for instance Grenadier [14], Weeds [27] or Lambrecht and Perraudin [ 21 ]).”
Investment, uncertainty and pre-emption (2010, background): “Other papers combining real options with game theory include Boyer, Lasserre, Mariotti, and Moreaux (2004), Huisman and Kort (1999), Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) and Pawlina and Kort (2006); these, however, do not generate the comparative static result we find.”
Real Options in an Asymmetric Duopoly: Who Benefits from Your Competitive Disadvantage? (2006, unknown): “The described situation closely resembles Leahy (1993), in which a firm which faces subsequent investments of its competitors pursues the same investment policy as a monopolist that is not threatened by such future events.”
Real Options Signaling Games with Applications to Corporate Finance (2011, unknown): “1 The early literature, started byBrennan and Schwartz (1985) andMcDonald and Siegel (1986), is well summarized inDixit and Pindyck (1994). Recently the real options framework has been extended to incorporate competition among several option holders (e.”