Real Options in an Asymmetric Duopoly: Who Benefits from Your Competitive Disadvantage?
By Grzegorz Pawlina, P. M. Kort. 2006
218 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cd644619e31fe1f57042fe7ff24e5c9c91a3f28e
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Robin Mason
- Eduardo S. Schwartz
- K. Miltersen
- Helen Weeds
- Nina Lange
- Gonzalo Cortazar
- Anders B. Trolle
- Lorenzo Naranjo
In Finance
- Robin Mason
- K. Miltersen
- Eduardo S. Schwartz
- Helen Weeds
- Nina Lange
- Lars Stentoft
- Fred Espen Benth
- René A. Carmona
Citations in the corpus
- Investment, uncertainty and pre-emption (2010, background): “Other papers combining real options with game theory include Boyer, Lasserre, Mariotti, and Moreaux (2004), Huisman and Kort (1999), Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) and Pawlina and Kort (2006); these, however, do not generate the comparative static result we find.”
- R&D Investments with Competitive Interactions (2004, background): “The aspect of asymmetric competing firms is analyzed by Pawlina and Kort (2001).”