Fractionalization and the Size of Government

By J. Lind. Social Science Research Network, 2007

198 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper studies the joint effect of fractionalization and inequality on the size of government. Within a political economy model of tax determination, I study the effect of voters with a group-based social conscience, so they care more about the well-being of those belonging to their own group than the rest of the population. Under general assumptions, both fractionalization and group antagonism reduce the support for redistribution. Whereas within group inequality increases support for redistribution, inequality between groups have the opposite effect. All these results hold even if a poor group is in majority. Using a panel data set for the US constructed from micro data, I find support for the hypothesis that within race inequality increases and between group inequality decreases redistribution.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3ed6ba8c862a265d7ab19ad9b902beee189ec907

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Michael Lounsbury
2. Karine Van der Straeten
3. H. Stichnoth

In Gender Studies

1. Michael Lounsbury
2. Karine Van der Straeten
3. H. Stichnoth

Citations in the corpus

• ETHNIC DIVERSITY, PUBLIC SPENDING, AND INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT FOR THE WELFARE STATE: A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE (2013, background): “Lind (2007), whose study has already been reviewed above in the section on aggregate outcomes, also shows evidence from the General Social Survey.”
• An institutional logics approach to social entrepreneurship: Market logic, religious diversity, and resource acquisition by microfinance organizations (2016, background): “It has been shown to lead to discrimination and domination of minority groups, inter-group antagonism, reduced inter-group communication and trust, and lack of public good provision and wealth distribution (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2001; Baldwin and Huber, 2010; Fearon, 2003; Fearon and”