A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief

By Eric Schwitzgebel. 2002

337 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3e8069dbab3ff446ad54574de59eaf858e8f6a1e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

In Philosophy

Citations in the corpus

Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception (2008, background): “According to some approaches to belief, it is possible for an agent to have inconsistent beliefs at one and the same time, as long as the beliefs in question have different triggering conditions (Lewis 1986; Schwitzgebel 2002).”
In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions (2005, background): “One important aspect of Schwitzgebel’s dispositional account of belief is its appeal, in contrast to traditional dispositional accounts, to phenomenal dispositions—dispositions to undergo certain sort of conscious experiences, including emotional experiences—in addition to behavioural and cognitive ”
Consciousness, Implicit Attitudes and Moral Responsibility (2014, neutral): “As Schwitzgebel (2002) notes, beliefs are constituted by a set of dispositions, all or most of which subjects also explicitly accept (or would accept): the disposition to assert p, the disposition to be surprised if not-p, the disposition to rely on p, to take p as a premise in reasoning, to deny q…”
A Dispositional Approach to Attitudes: Thinking Outside of the Belief Box (2013, background): “It is to tend to expect them to make worthwhile colloquium comments, to seek 1 See critiques of the warehouse model of memory in Bartlett 1932; Neisser 1967; Roediger 1980; and Sutton 2008; and my critique of such models in developmental psychology in Schwitzgebel 1999 and McGeer and Schwitzgebel 20”
Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science (2018, background): “…and yet feels suspicious when he comes home red-eyed late at night and is apt to tell her therapist that she’s worried about her son’s marijuana use (Schwitzgebel 2002, 260–261); (c) A person who asserts that white people are not superior to black people, and yet displays behavior indicative of…”