Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science

By Jake Quilty‐Dunn, Eric Mandelbaum. 2018

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Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, storage, and change.

Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology, History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1ff823c118c2f606a15ff708461f4665d696b7e8