The economics of crowdfunding platforms

By Paul Belleflamme, Nessrine Omrani, Martin Peitz. Information Economics and Policy, 2015

570 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper provides a description of the crowdfunding sector, considering investment- based crowdfunding platforms as well as platforms in which funders do not obtain monetary payments. It lays out key features of this quickly developing sector and explores the economic forces at play that can explain the design of these platforms. In particular, it elaborates on cross-group and within-group external effects and asymmetric information on crowdfunding platforms.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Information Systems, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3e670799d82dd61f072a1d8a5ba34964e187cf8f

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Citations in the corpus

Equity crowdfunding: A new phenomena (2016, background): “The data from SEEDRS, while limited to one platform, albeit a very important European one, suggests that equity 2 In the recent literature review by Belleflamme et al (2015) we found 13 references to papers on rewardsbased crowdfunding, 12 papers on lending, 3 on donations, and finally 2 on equity…”
The role of venture capital in the emerging entrepreneurial finance ecosystem: future threats and opportunities (2019, background): “…basis; deferring the money transfer to entrepreneurs; and providing investors with risk management contracts hedging specific risks (Mollick 2014; Belleflamme, Omrani, and Peitz 2015, 2015; Iyer et al. 2016; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016; Lambert, Ralcheva, and Roosenboom 2018; Vismara 2018).”
The power of positivity? The influence of positive psychological capital language on crowdfunding performance (2018, background): “The online nature of crowdfunding, where information can be difficult to verify, combined with the inexperience of investors, makes crowdfunding a particularly noisy environment (Belleflamme et al., 2015).”
A Theory of Crowdfunding - A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard (2017, background): “3Agrawal et al. (2014) and Belleflamme et al. (2015) discuss this effect informally, while Chang (2015), Chemla and Tinn (2016), Ellman and Hurkens (2015), Gruener and Siemroth (2015), Schwienbacher (2015), and this paper model it explicitly. investigate the potential of such contracts to implement…”