What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say about the Transmission of Monetary Policy
By Anil K. Kashyap, Jeremy C. Stein. 2000
2,518 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3dda474c7ed468db86bae73ecc7e39f75887ec98
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- L. Gambacorta
- Luc Laeven
- Allen N. Berger
- José-Luis Peydró
- Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
- Stijn Claessens
- David Marqués-Ibáñez
- Yener Altunbaş
In Finance
- Luc Laeven
- L. Gambacorta
- Allen N. Berger
- Stijn Claessens
- José-Luis Peydró
- Steven R. G. Ongena
- Neeltje van Horen
- Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
Citations in the corpus
- Macroeconomic Propagation Under Different Regulatory Regimes: Evidence From an Estimated DSGE Model For the Euro Area (2010, neutral): “…some degree of market power, which may derive from banks being “special” in the sense of being able to reduce (by acting 3See, e.g., Bernanke and Lown (1991), Peek and Rosengren (1995), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Van den Heuvel (2002), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), and Kishan and Opiela (2006).”
- Banks’ exposure to interest rate risk and the transmission of monetary policy (2020, methodology): “Second, we estimate our regressions controlling for bank asset liquidity interacted with interest rates movements, in the spirit of Kashyap and Stein (2000).”
- Liquidity and Leverage (2010, positive): “The second is the channel that operates through the banks’ balance sheets, either through the liquidity structure of the banks’ balance sheets (Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Kashyap and Stein (2000)), or the cushioning effect of the banks’ capital (Van den Heuvel (2002)).”
- Capital flows and the international credit channel (2017, background): “…as we do in this paper.3 We also contribute to the literature that tries to identify the credit supply channel of monetary policy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jiménez et al., 2012), although we focus on capital flows instead of domestic and/or foreign monetary policy.”
- Does Credit Crunch Investment Down? New Evidence on the Real Effects of the Bank-Lending Channel (2016, background): “There is large evidence that banks reduce their supply of loans when suffering liquidity shocks, as predicted by the bank lending channel (Kashyap and Stein 2000, Khwaja and Mian 2008).”
- Monetary stimulus and bank lending (2020, positive): “In this choice, our approach is similar to Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Khwaja and Mian (2008). Additionally, in any treatment on the treated analysis, the initial state before the treatment needs to be controlled for so that only the change since the treatment is attributed to the treatment.”
- Are There Bank Effects in Borrowers' Costs of Funds? Evidence from a Matched Sample of Borrowers and Banks* (2002, background): “evidence that monetary policy can affect the composition of bank balance sheets (see, e.g., Kashyap and Stein 1995, 2000), the bank lending channel also requires that borrowers face switching costs among banks or between bank and nonbank sources of funds.”
- Cross-Border Banking and the International Transmission of Financial Distress During the Crisis of 2007-2008 (2010, background): “The bank lending channel has been studied extensively (e.g., Kashyap and Stein (2000)), and banks have been found to rely heavily on the use of internal capital markets in order to dampen domestic liquidity shocks (e.g., Stein (1997); Houston, James, and Marcus (1997)).”
- Tracing the Impact of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from an Emerging Market (2008, positive): “…may be confounded by economy wide productivity shocks then led to work such as Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Ashcraft (2006) that use cross-sectional variation in liquidity supply across banks or rms to purge out economy levels…”
- The financial accelerator in an evolving credit network (2010, background): “…those fixed by low-capitalized ones.5 In other words, when banks have partial knowledge of loan quality and the market for bank debt is imperfect (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000; Stein, 1998; Kishan and Opiela, 2000), it raises an asymmetric information problem about banks’ assets and a lemon’s…”
- The Role of Interbank Markets in Monetary Policy: A Model with Rationing (2008, methodology): “Kashyap and Stein (2000) argue that their result is entirely driven by the smaller banks, which are those that are more affected by asymmetric information problems.”