A game theory approach to measuring the performance reliability of transport networks
By Michael G. H. Bell. 2000
406 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Transportation
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3d299063632c7591ebc20975e421db2e414532e5
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Transportation
- Michael A. P. Taylor
- Wai Yuen Szeto
- Manwo Ng
- S. Waller
- David P. Watling
- Stephen Clark
- Alireza Talebpour
- Samer H. Hamdar
Citations in the corpus
- Modeling Lane-Changing Behavior in a Connected Environment: A Game Theory Approach (2015, background): “These studies focused mainly on vehicular traffic and on the strategic decision making level (i.e. route choice, departure time choice, destination choice and mode choice) (Bell, 2000; Fisk, 1984; Hollander and Prashker, 2006; Tosin, 2008).”
- Modelling network travel time reliability under stochastic demand (2005, background): “Bell (2000) and Bell & Cassir (2002) avoided the difficult issue of defining performance probabilities by supposing that they arose from a game between the drivers and an evil entity, suggesting they could be used as a cautious basis for network design when users are pessimistic about the…”
- Travel through time: the story of research on travel time reliability (2013, methodology): “Bell’s game theory model involving the ‘evil entity’ opponent (Bell 2000) would be one example of the enhancement of the user equilibrium model, while Shao et al. (2006) provided another alternative. Sumalee and Watling (2003), Inouye (2003), Chen and Zhou (2010) and Fu, Lam, and Chen (in press) pro”
- An optimization approach for deriving upper and lower bounds of transportation network vulnerability under simultaneous disruptions of multiple links (2018, methodology): “On a different line of research, the game theoretic approach has been developed to assess the transportation network vulnerability, such as Bell (2000) of considering a two-player zero-sum non-cooperative game, Bell and Cassir (2002) of considering a multiplayer game, and Szeto et al. (2007) of…”
- Distribution-free travel time reliability assessment with probability inequalities (2011, background): “A fundamentally different approach that utilizes game theory to assess travel time reliability has been taken by, for instance, Bell (2000) and Szeto et al. (2009).”