Seeing and believing: perception, belief formation and the divided mind

By Andy Egan. 2008

170 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Sociology and Political Science, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3a8edc17399d1859c1dda4f521ffcb533d5e4d02

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. Jake Quilty‐Dunn
2. Jane Friedman
3. Eric Mandelbaum

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Jake Quilty‐Dunn
2. Jane Friedman
3. Eric Mandelbaum

In Philosophy

1. Jake Quilty‐Dunn
2. Jane Friedman
3. Eric Mandelbaum

Citations in the corpus

• Why Suspend Judging (2017, background): “See Lewis (1982) and Egan (2008) for some discussion.”
• Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science (2018, background): “The idea that beliefs are fragmented is not an ad hoc stipulation to save representationalism; theorists who reject representationalism nonetheless accept fragmentation (e.g., Lewis 1982; Stalnaker 1984; Egan 2008; Elga and Rayo ms).”