Misselling through agents

By Roman Inderst, Marco Ottaviani. 2009

346 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3a3f86f9c574c8cdb39bc003bb1641bf12012645

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In Management Science and Operations Research

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Citations in the corpus

How Does Household Portfolio Diversification Vary with Financial Literacy and Financial Advice (2011, neutral): “Academic economist’s typical advice of investing in low-fee index funds competes with many attempts to guide household’s behaviour where the form of the message is designed by professional marketing forces, but the content is likely to suit to the needs of consumers less than optimally (Inderst and ”
Strategic Obfuscation and Consumer Protection Policy (2014, neutral): “2 In 1 Relying on outside advice may not help in making good decisions as this advice may be biased due to agency problems between ﬁnancial institutions, their sales agents and consumers (Bolton et al. (2007); Inderst and Ottaviani (2009, 2012); Woodward and Hall (2012)).”
How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer financial protection ☆ (2012, methodology): “With credit products, brokers compensation is often tied to the interest rate through the so-called yield spread; see Jackson and Burlingame (2007). Sellers of life insurance plans may be paid both up-front or via a trail-commission over the duration of the contract; see Cummins and Doherty (2006”
How Does Household Portfolio Diversification Vary with Financial Literacy and Financial Advice?: Financial Literacy and Household Portfolio Diversification (2015, neutral): “…typical advice of investing in low-fee index funds competes with many attempts to guide households’ behavior, where the form of the message is designed by professional marketing forces and its content is not necessarily adapted to suit the needs of consumers (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009).”
Retail Financial Advice: Does One Size Fit All? (2015, neutral): “…Accounting for an equity premium of, say, 6% per year and our earlier finding that advisors raise their clients’ allocation to risky assets by 30 percentage points, we estimate households gain 2Agency conflicts are one possible explanation for the high cost of advice (Inderst and Ottaviani 2009).”
Financial literacy, financial advice, and financial behavior (2017, background): “21 In a related study, Japelli (2010) conducts a cross-country assessment of economic literacy in 55 countries based on the IMD World Competitive Yearbook (WCY).”
Catering to Investors Through Security Design: Headline Rate and Complexity (2017, methodology): “The present paper also complements research on the dark side of financial advice provided to retail clients (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009; Anagol et al., 2013; Bergstresser and Beshears, 2010; Hackethal et al., 2012; Karabulut, 2013; Hoechle et al., 2015; Foerster et al., 2015; Gennaioli et al., 2015”
Financial Literacy and the Demand for Financial Advice (2015, neutral): “Moreover, S pays a penalty for misselling (as in Inderst and Ottaviani 2009), representing “reputational costs”, expected legal costs for litigation procedures, or the monetary costs of forgone customers, among others.”
Asking for Help: Survey and Experimental Evidence on Financial Advice and Behavior Change (2010, background): “The theoretical and empirical economics research literature on investment advice has largely been concerned with moral hazard problems inherent in the advisor–advisee relationship (see, e.g., Liu, 2005; Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009; Yoong and Hung, 2009; Hackethal et al., 2012; Turner and Muir, 2013)”
The Credit Ratings Game (2012, neutral): “rst-best (constrained, of course, by the precision of the CRAs’ information).(27) The other major robustness issue we explore is how our analysis is modi.”