Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion

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Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries, and Mergers (2005, background): “If the condition in (4) (or, equivalently, (5)) holds for all i, then the collusive solution is self-enforcing for every single firm in the coalition.”
The Economics of Tacit Collusion (2003, background): “…λ = 1) and increases with the asymmetry in production capacity: the smaller the relative size of the small firm, the higher the critical threshold δ*. Compte et al. (2002) generalise this result to an arbitrary number of firms: the above threshold remains relevant, interpreting KS as the…”
Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? Second Version (2005, unknown): “For the main part of the paper, we will follow the tradition of Friedman (1971) and consider whether such equilibria are supportable by the play of trigger strategies: infinite reversion to the repeated play of the static equilibrium of the stage game, following a deviation by one of the firms.”
Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion – The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments (2012, unknown): “See Compte et al. (2002) and Kühn (forthcoming).”
Excess Capacity and Pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets: Experimental Evidence (2013, unknown): “p [ (F (p))n−1(m− nk) + k ] = p(m− (n− 1)k) (6) (F (p))n−1 = p(m− (n− 1)k)− pk p(m− nk) (7)”