The Economics of Tacit Collusion

By Marco Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, P. Seabright, Jean Tirole. 2003

295 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b9c0adafdecc3d0bfaa1f250378794e7b9d1624b

Citations in the corpus

• Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion – The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments (2012, unknown): “This conventional wisdom appears on the common lists of factors facilitating collusion (Scherer, 1980; Tirole, 1989; Ivaldi et al., 2003; Levenstein and Suslow, 2006).”
• Pass-through as an Economic Tool (2009, unknown): “Demand-side incentives for collusion depend on the relative value of the gains to monopoly and the incentives for defection, which are independent of elasticities (Ivaldi et al., 2003) but seem clearly tied to pass-through rates or their slope.”