The Impact of SFAS No. 131 on Information and Monitoring

By Philip G. Berger, Rebecca N. Hann. 2003

436 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/36fdf88cf388679f554f6cba739c9173d8450181

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Citations in the corpus

Over-investment of free cash flow (2006, background): “…1976), (iii) diversifying acquisitions (e.g., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990), and (iv) subsidizing poorly performing divisions using the cash generated from successful ones instead of returning the cash to shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Lamont 1997 and Berger and Hann, 2003).”
Firm and Investor Responses to Uncertain Tax Benefit Disclosure Requirements (2013, neutral): “Little empirical research exists, however, on the effects of proprietary costs on disclosure, except in the area of segment reporting (Hayes and Lundholm 1996; Leuz 2004; Berger and Hann 2003, 2007; Botosan and Stanford 2005).”
The Information Content of Goodwill Impairments and SFAS 142 (2011, background): “Berger and Hann (2003) find that an increase in the quality of disclosed segment information improves analyst forecast accuracy. Per Watts (2003), it may be precisely for such firms where the joint cost/benefit problem of assigning synergy-based intangibles to unique operating divisions is most pron”
Boards: Does One Size Fit All? (2008, methodology): “Therefore, for segment data after 1998, we use the methodology suggested in Berger and Hann (2003) to classify firms as single-segment or multi-segment.”
Lead independent directors and investment efficiency (2020, background): “Powerful CEOs also engage in perquisite consumption (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and in subsidizing poorly performing divisions (e.g., Lamont, 1997; Berger and Hann, 2003), which drives further investment inefficiencies.”
Challenges and opportunities in disclosure research—A discussion of 'the financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature' $ (2011, neutral): “Berger and Hann (2007)”
Discretionary Disclosure in Financial Reporting: An Examination Comparing Internal Firm Data to Externally Reported Segment Data (2011, methodology): “Hence, in section 5.3.1 we: (1) report a validity check of our disclosure measure, MATCH, using a comparison based on the data set collected by Berger and Hann (2003; 2007) and (2) discuss a sensitivity check in which we define industries on the basis of three-digit SIC codes.”
Controlling for endogeneity with instrumental variables in strategic management research (2008, background): “As the studies of Berger and Hann (2003), Denis et al.”
Diversification Discount or Premium? New Evidence from the Business Information Tracking Series (2004, background): “As expected, its implementation has resulted in a greater number of segments being reported by at least certain firms (Berger and Hann (2002, 2003)).”
Corporate Investments: Learning from Restatements (2009, neutral): “First, other firms anticipate that competitors rely on their financial reports, and thus consider proprietary concerns in their accounting choices (Choi and Levich [1990], Harris [1998], Berger and Hann [2003], Graham et al.”
Conditional conservatism and the limits to earnings management (2020, positive): “If SFAS131 improves the information environment and monitoring, as shown by Berger and Hann (2003) and Botosan and Stanford (2005), we expect a negative β1 coefficient in model (3.b), consistent with a decrease in earnings management after its passage.”