Voluntary Environmental Investment and Responsive Regulation

By John W. Maxwell, Christopher S. Decker. 2006

161 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Marketing, Nature and Landscape Conservation, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/36db3d6e1ce9640a18352f29e3823e564e3b5d9b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Marketing

1. Magali A. Delmas
2. Michael W. Toffel
3. Thomas P. Lyon
4. George Deltas
5. D. R. Harrington
6. Daniel C. Matisoff
7. Madhu Khanna
8. John W. Maxwell

In Nature and Landscape Conservation

1. Thomas P. Lyon
2. John W. Maxwell

In Strategy and Management

1. Magali A. Delmas
2. Michael W. Toffel
3. Thomas P. Lyon
4. Madhu Khanna
5. George Deltas
6. John W. Maxwell
7. D. R. Harrington
8. Daniel C. Matisoff

Citations in the corpus

• Organizational Responses to Environmental Demands: Opening the Black Box (2008, background): “Firms might participate to gain favorable publicity or greater flexibility in complying with existing regulations, or to deter the imposition of new regulations (Decker, 2005; Lyon and Maxwell, 2004; Maxwell and Decker, 2006; Segerson and Miceli, 1998).”
• Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective (2008, background): “Indeed, Maxwell and Decker (2006) show that if a firm voluntarily makes an observable investment in pollution control that lowers its marginal cost of abatement, then it is optimal for the regulator to monitor the firm less frequently.17”
• Kindred spirits or intergovernmental competition? The innovation and diffusion of energy policies in the American states (1990–2008) (2014, background): “Similarly, the record on the relationship between business investment, environmental performance, and regulatory stringency is mixed (Porter and van der Linde 1995, Maxwell and Decker 2006).”
• Environmental Public Voluntary Programs Reconsidered (2007, background): “Maxwell and Decker (2006) present a model of programs such as Performance Track that reward good corporate behavior with a reduced likelihood of inspection.”
• Adoption of Pollution Prevention Techniques: The Role of Management Systems and Regulatory Pressures (2009, background): “…of itT on itY consistently if the following conditions are satisfied (Wooldridge 2002): the error term has zero conditional mean; the variance of the error is constant; the standard rank condition is satisfied; and the TQEM adoption is adequately described by a probit model (Wooldridge 2002).”