Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership

183 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Credit Default Swaps: A Survey (2014, background): “In other words, these lenders become “empty creditors”, a term coined by Hu and Black (2008) to refer to creditors whose exposures are hedged by CDS.”
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors (2009, unknown): “One ramification of these disclosure exemptions is that activists have used the stock-lending (Christoffersen et al. (2007)) or derivative markets (Hu and Black (2007)) to acquire voting rights without owning a long position in the company’s underlying stock.”
Blockholders and Corporate Governance (2014, unknown): “See Brav & Mathews (2011) for a theoretical analysis and Hu & Black (2007) for empirics.”
Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem (2011, unknown): “Hu and Black (2006, 2007) and Kahan and Rock (2007) argue that such decoupling can give rise to the opposite voting preferences from those of unhedged common equity holders and thus to ine¢ cient outcomes, such as voting for a merger, which results in a decline in stock price of the acquirer, and…”
Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay (2013, unknown): “Prior studies document a strong association between proxy advisors’ recommendations and voting outcomes (e.g. Cai et al., 2009).”