Bids and Allocations in European IPO Bookbuilding

By T. Jenkinson, Howard Jones. 2004

193 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/35ec50adbec00994f9de079cb56e7a454d9fb221

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Citations in the corpus

Financial Wealth, Socioemotional Wealth, and IPO Underpricing in Family Firms: A Two-stage Gamble Model (2017, background): “…owners obtain new information and develop a new sense of firm value, they may revise the terms of the offering, such as the amount of ownership retained (Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2005), the timing of the IPO (Jenkinson & Jones, 2004), and the choice of underwriters (Krigman, Shaw, & Womack, 2001).”
Global trends in IPO methods: Book building versus auctions with endogenous entry (2005, background): “Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) use unique data sets to examine the orders and allocations for investors in book building IPOs (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003, examine the determinants of offer prices).”
Auctioned IPOs: The U.S. Evidence (2009, unknown): “Jenkinson and Jones’ (2009) survey of IPO pricing and allocation finds that institutional investors do not believe that their bidding behavior will affect IPO”
Endogenous Entry and Partial Adjustment in IPO Auctions: Are Institutional Investors Better Informed? (2010, unknown): “See, for example, Bazerman and Samuelson (1983); Kagel and Levin (1986); and Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau (1987).”
Differences between European and American IPO Markets (2003, background): “A number of empirical papers have focused on allocations between institutional investors and individuals (Jenkinson and Jones, 2002; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002).”
Litigation Risk, Strategic Disclosure and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings (2012, background): “The relevance of appeasing IPO shareholders is supported by the findings of Cheng, Huang, Li, and Lobo (2010), who show that lawsuits with an institutional lead plaintiff are less likely to be dismissed and have significantly larger settlements.”