Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach

By G. Majone. 2001

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Information Exchange in Policy Networks (2012, background): “In these regimes, non-majoritarian institutions, such as institutionalized policy committees, are implemented in order to overcome transaction costs (Gehring and Kerler 2008; Majone 2001).”
Principal-agent theory and research policy: An introduction (2003, background): “…to bureaucracy by Congress (McCubbins, 1984; Weingast, 1984), delegation to “independent regulatory agencies” (Majone, 2001a) and central banks (Majone, 2001b; Elgie, 2002), as well as of all relations in the “democratic chain of delegation” from the voter to the implementing bureaucracy…”
The Politicization of Regulatory Agencies: Between Partisan Influence and Formal Independence (2016, background): “2000) – a fact that has not been lost on scholars who anticipate a waning of democratic accountability as a result of this process (Christensen and Lægreid 2007; Maggetti 2010; Mair 2008: 228; Majone 2001).”
De facto independence after delegation: A fuzzy‐set analysis (2007, methodology): “Rather, following Majone (2001), we use the term ‘‘independence’’ in the sense of separateness, developing the concept of de facto independence as a way to assess the independence of the agencies’ day-today regulatory action, and operationalizing it through the two components derived from the…”