Order Without Law

By Cass R. Sunstein. 2017

204 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3431b0d1876d83c457f270dc61d3a17183584ec4

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In Political Science and International Relations

Citations in the corpus

Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange (2005, unknown): “For analysis, see Greif 1994b, 1996 1998, forthcoming. secured property rights.”
Building trust in online auction markets through an economic incentive mechanism (2003, background): “Ellickson [10] finds that the residents of rural Shasta County (California) apply informal norms, rather than formal legal rules, to resolve most of the issues that arise among them.”
The Best Laid Plans: The Impact of Informal Rules on Formal Institutions in Transitional Regimes (2010, background): “33 22 January 2000, Polityka. was vigilant and a stringent civil service law was passed in 1992, we see the lowest rates of expansion.”
Institutions: Rules or Equilibria? (2011, background): “For example, based on his studies of cattle farmers in Shasta county and New England whalers, Robert Ellickson (1991) hypothesizes that groups within which information (gossip) circulates easily and informal power is broadly distributed will tend to develop efficient informal rules.”
Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances (2006, unknown): “, lower the client's desire to expropriate the target), Grossman and Hart (1986) and Aghion and Tirole (1994) show that residual income rights alone do not solve the incentive problems posed by incomplete contracts.”
Rules of Play (2009, background): “Several companies and numerous individuals have made considerable amounts of money by engaging in the trade of virtual property (Dibbell, 2005).”
Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies (2006, background): “Ellickson (1991) discusses the protection of property rights among cattle farmers in California. McMillan and Woodruff (1999) find evidence of private ordering in Vietnam during its transition to a market economy. Besley (1995) analyzes the protection of property rights for farmers in Ghana. Gambett”