The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness

By Dorothée Legrand. 2006

237 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/33409cfa139c02fc4d892cd8003ef6d4f9a535c6

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Citations in the corpus

Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories (2009, background): “To explain the phenomenological status of incorporation we need to distinguish between two ways of experiencing the body—the body-as-object and the bodyas-subject (Legrand 2006, 2007a, b).”
Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience (2005, background): “This kind of experience is consciousness of the body-as-subject (Legrand 2005).”
The Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) (2012, background): “Body awareness, although integral to the mindfulness construct [53,94,97,103], has not been assessed as such in mindfulness instruments.”
Beyond the comparator model: a multifactorial two-step account of agency. (2008, background): “The CM is able to explain the SoA as an intrinsic property of the action processing itself (Gallagher, 2004; Haggard, 2005; Legrand, 2006; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005a, 2005b): Via an efference copy, motor processes directly inform the comparator, which in turn evokes our SoA.”
Sensorimotor intentionality: The origins of intentionality in prospective agent action (2013, background): “…even from before birth, incorporates an anticipatory structure engaged toward some future consequence, even though such action in early development is not necessarily conceptually or cognitively complex (Lee, 2005; Lee, 2009; Legrand, 2006; Trevarthen, 1984; von Hofsten, 2004; von Hofsten, 2009).”
What is embodiment? A psychometric approach. (2008, unknown): “…termed ''embodiment " (Arzy, Overney, Landis, & Blanke, 2006), ''coenaesthesia " (Critchley , 1953), ''bodily self-consciousness " (Bermú dez, 1998; Legrand, 2006), or ''corporeal awareness " (Berlucchi & Aglioti, 1997; Critchley, 1979), has often been described as a non-conceptual, somatic, form…”