The Role of Dividends, Debt and Board Structure in the Governance of Family Controlled Firms
By Lauw Lukas Yulian Setia-Atmaja, George Tanewski, Michael T. Skully. 2009
342 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/32674139cee136a29c248f7d789869900e928ac7
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In Accounting
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Citations in the corpus
- Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Private Family Firms (2010, background): “Prior research on financial reporting quality and earnings management behavior in public family firms has focused on the agency problem between controlling and noncontrolling shareholders when discussing low financial reporting quality and earnings management (Ali et al., 2007; Jiraporn & Dadalt, 20”
- The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy: The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy (2016, neutral): “In contrast, Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski, and Skully (2009) and Isakov and Weisskopf (2015) find that family firms exhibit higher dividend payouts in Australia and Switzerland, respectively.”
- Financing Decisions in Family Businesses: A Review and Suggestions for Developing the Field (2017, background): “These studies thus find support for the expropriation hypothesis, according to which paying dividends is a mechanism that can be used to align the interests of controlling family and minority shareholders (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009).”
- Governance Mechanisms and Firm Value: The Impact of Ownership Concentration and Dividends (2009, background): “Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski, and Skully (2009) indicate that family controlled firms have lower independent boards than non-family firms in Australia.”