The Real Effects of Financial Shocks: Evidence from Exogenous Changes in Analyst Coverage

By F. Derrien, Ambrus Kecskés. 2012

430 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/31832f5360830886ce1f69b757411af9cef37036

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Citations in the corpus

Monitoring and Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2013, positive): “The behavior on the part of growth firms and equity issuers is consistent with recent evidence presented by Derrien and Kecskes (2012), who show that following a loss of coverage such firms lose access to external finance and as a consequence reduce investment.”
The Dark Side of Analyst Coverage: The Case of Innovation (2013, neutral): “, Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995; Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000; Yu, 2008; Ellul and Panayides, 2009), and therefore affect firms’ investment and financing decisions, stock prices, liquidity, and valuation (e.g., Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter, 2003; Irvine, 2003; Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary, 2006; Derrie”
Analyst Coverage and Real Earnings Management: Quasi-Experimental Evidence (2014, methodology): “This is consistent in terms of size and significance with research using a similar experimental design (e.g., Derrien and Kecskes (2013), Hong and Kacperczyk (2010)), in spite of sample differences occurring due to various data restrictions across these studies.”
Does Information Asymmetry Affect Corporate Tax Aggressiveness? (2017, methodology): “16 Note that we cannot use the long-term measure of tax effective rates (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008)) as we find that our exogenous events are temporary shocks to the firms and the effects disappear after 3 years, which is consistent with Derrien and Kecskes (2013). We discuss this in detail i”
Independent Director Reputation Incentives and Stock Price Informativeness (2017, background): “Dimson (1979) argue that parameter estimates can be severely biased if stocks are not frequently traded.”
Information Asymmetry, the Cost of Debt, and Credit Events: Evidence from Quasi-Random Analyst Disappearances (2016, methodology): “In the first category (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012; Derrien and Kecskés, 2013), the loss of an analyst leads to an increase in information asymmetry for the firm.”
The source of information in prices and investment-price sensitivity (2017, positive): “…eﬃciency as it can occur through many channels other than learning—for example, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) show that ITE reduces the cost of capital and Bushman et al. (2005) show that it affects analyst coverage (in turn, Derrien and Kecskés, 2013 show that analyst coverage has real effects).”