Profiting from Government Stakes in a Command Economy: Evidence from Chinese Asset Sales

By C. Calomiris, Raymond J. Fisman, Yongxiang Wang. 2010

236 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/30571e8e9856833fa2d93c406b6d617a62ba21d0

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Citations in the corpus

Nationalism and Economic Exchange: Evidence from Shocks to Sino-Japanese Relations (2014, background): “China’s economic reforms have not been accompanied by the same degree of political liberalization (Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang 2010).”
Political Connectedness and Court Outcomes: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Lawsuits (2015, background): “…Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.17 For management’s personal political ties, we follow Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) and Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang (2010) in defining a firm as politically connected if it has any director who is or was a government official at the…”
Acquisition Announcements and Stock Market Valuations of Acquiring Firms’ Rivals: A Test of the Growth Probability Hypothesis in China (2011, unknown): “…run event study analyses to measure Chinese stock market reactions and found significant cumulative abnormal returns around announcement dates during short event windows (e.g. Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang, 2010; Chen et al., 2005; Firth, Lin, and Zou, 2010; Miller et al., 2008; Zou et al., 2008).”
In the name of charity: Political connections and strategic corporate social responsibility in a transition economy (2015, background): “Like many other transitional economies, China employs a top-down political structure with the central government as chief administrator and local governments as policy implementers (Allen et al., 2005; Calomiris et al., 2008).”
Anti-Corruption Reforms and Shareholder Valuations: Event Study Evidence from China (2016, unknown): “…limiting corruption might instead just make “greasing” bureaucratic wheels and “getting things done” more difficult (Zeume, 2016), and reduce the value of past investments in political connections (Fisman, 2001; Wei, 2001; McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Li et al., 2008, and Calomiris et al., 2010).”
The Brain Gain of Corporate Boards: Evidence from China: The Brain Gain of Corporate Boards (2015, unknown): “A director is defined as politically connected if he or she is a current or former government bureaucrat following Fan et al. (2007) and Calomiris et al. (2010).”
Government Connections and Financial Constraints: Evidence from a Large Representative Sample of Chinese Firms (2013, unknown): “(2010) and Calomiris et al. (2010). 7”
The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China* (2017, unknown): “State-owned firms can use their formal political connections to maneuver for more advantageous market positions (e.g., Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang, 2010).”
The effect of mandatory CSR disclosure on firm profitability and social externalities: Evidence from China (2017, unknown): “We reason that while investors might have expected the mandate before the announcement, it is unlikely that they would have reacted to the news before receiving the official announcement of the mandate and the firms included ( Calomiris et al., 2010 ). We perform this analysis by examining the cumul”