Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions

By J. Ganuza, Jose S. Penalva. 2010

226 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2f926fbb98d9486ff559b1d8e22aed75f8adb3a6

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Anne-Katrin Roesler
2. Hao Li
3. Xianwen Shi
4. Balázs Szentes

In Marketing

1. Anne-Katrin Roesler
2. Hao Li
3. Xianwen Shi
4. Balázs Szentes

Citations in the corpus

• Online advertising and privacy (2014, unknown): “Regarding our second question, namely whether the platform provides the right amount of information from a social welfare perspective, our analysis partially relies on insights formulated by Ganuza (2004) and Ganuza and Penalva (2010).”
• Discriminatory Information Disclosure (2017, background): “These two assumptions are sufficient for Proposition 1 below but neither is necessary,(10) and both are satisfied if the original mechanism (ai, pi) under full disclosure is revenuemaximizing.(11)”
• Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing (2017, background): “Therefore, the 3Another strand of the literature analyzes the seller’s incentives to reveal information about the buyers’ valuations prior to participating in an auction, see for example, Ganuza (2004), Ganuza and Penalva (2010) and Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007).”