The Quiet Period Goes out with a Bang
By D. Bradley, Bradford D. Jordan, Jay R. Ritter. 2003
342 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2ecad14f8e8781fc2ac300727a6166427b303ece
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In Accounting
- Jay R. Ritter
- Tim Loughran
- D. Bradley
- Bradford D. Jordan
- Qiang Cheng
- Simona Mola
- Xia Chen
- Robert M. Bowen
Citations in the corpus
- Discounting and Clustering in Seasoned Equity Offering Prices (2004, background): “Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003), in examination of a sample of IPOs during 1996–2000, report that the more analysts initiating coverage, the more positive the abnormal returns for the issuer at the end of the quiet period.”
- Investment Banking and Securities Issuance (2003, background): “Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2003) report average market-adjusted returns of 3% in the week surrounding the end of the quiet period.”
- Analyst Behavior Following IPOs: The “Bubble Period” Evidence (2008, methodology): “For example, in Table 1, over half of all recommendations are made by deal managers, and, from Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003), we know that typically the deal 3 In 2002, after the end of our sample period, most major securities firms switched to a three-point classification scheme in…”
- Analyst Coverage and the Cost of Raising Equity Capital: Evidence from Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings (2008, methodology): “In contrast, a positive market impact of initiation of analyst coverage, as found in Branson et al. (1998) and Bradley et al. (2003), does not necessarily imply a reduction in the cost of capital because initiation of analyst coverage is almost always associated with favorable stock recommendations…”
- Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory and Practice (2004, neutral): “Booth and Chua (1996) argue that underpricing helps ensure a wide-base of owners to increase the liquidity of the newly public firm. Along similar lines, Brennan and Franks (1997) agree that underpricing allows for a wide-base of owners but argue the motivation is to entrench management. Siconolfi (”
- Strategic IPO Underpricing, Information Momentum, and Lockup Expiration Selling (2002, neutral): “Bradley et al. (2001) provide evidence that six-month returns through the end of the lockup period are positively related to the number of analysts initiating research coverage.”
- Do Initial Public Offering Firms Purchase Analyst Coverage with Underpricing (2004, background): “14 Consistent with Bradley et al. (2003), this is more common in the earlier years of our sample period.”
- Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism (2007, neutral): “Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003) note that analyst rating schemes are not standardized, and can vary from one firm to another, so we use the standard IBES recommendations.”