Analyst Behavior Following IPOs: The “Bubble Period” Evidence

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The Informational Role of Bond Analysts (2009, unknown): “Although there is some dissent (e.g., Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 2006), the extant literature is generally consistent with this notion.”
The Economics of Conflicts of Interest in Financial Institutions (2006, unknown): “In contrast, Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2006) examine IPOs in 1999 and 2000 and find no evidence of a differential reaction between affiliated and unaffiliated analyst initiations once they control for recommendation characteristics and timing.”
Strength of Analyst Coverage Following IPOs (2006, unknown): “Bradley et al. (2005) come to a similar conclusion when interpreting their Table 7 results.”
Equilibrium in the Initial Public Offerings Market (2011, background): “Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2008) report that 98% of U.S. IPOs from 1999-2000 that had a file price midpoint of at least $8.00 per share had analyst coverage from a bookrunner within one year of the IPO.”
Local Underwriter Oligopolies and IPO Underpricing (2011, background): “Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2008) report a 3% announcement abnormal return for firms with unanticipated analyst coverage initiations in the year after the IPO (exclusive of anticipated initiations at the end of the quiet period).”