Pleasure and the good life

By F. Feldman. 2004

199 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Subjective Well-Being: Measuring Happiness, Suffering, and Other Dimensions of Experience (2014, background): “This is somewhat related to Fred Feldman’s attitudinal hedonism (Feldman, 2004).”
Happiness is not Well-Being (2012, background): “These include versions of hedonism (Feldman 2004), desire-satisfactionism (Murphy 1999; Heathwood 2006; Lukas 2010), the Objective List Theory (Arneson 1999), aim-achievementism (Scanlon 1998; Keller 2009), developmentalism (Kraut 1979), the life-satisfaction theory (Sumner 1996), the…”
Monism and Pluralism about Value (2015, background): “Velleman, J. (1991).”
Life satisfaction, ethical reflection, and the science of happiness (2007, background): “Recent defenses of mental state theories of welfare, notably hedonism, include Crisp (forthcoming), Feldman (2004) and Silverstein (2000).”
Emotion Experience and its Varieties (2009, background): “Extensive introspective research led to the conclusion that pleasure has no phenomenology (Arnold, 1960; Feldman, 2004): that research did not yield any description of pleasure other than the occasional mention of body feelings such as “bright pressure” (Arnold, 1960).”