When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts

By G. L. Stephens, G. Graham. 2000

178 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Clinical Psychology, General Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2d3d0d4fe5edf3960e0fdcd99469416719eeab33

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Clinical Psychology

1. Helena De Preester
2. Elisabeth Pacherie
3. Jakob Hohwy
4. Alexander A. Fingelkurts
5. Charles Fernyhough

In General Psychology

1. Helena De Preester
2. E. D. Di Paolo
3. Elisabeth Pacherie
4. Jakob Hohwy
5. Alexander A. Fingelkurts
6. Charles Fernyhough

Citations in the corpus

• The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency vs. Joint-Agency (2012, background): “…that schizophrenic patients with delusions of alien control no longer feel as though they are in control of their actions because “particular thoughts and actions may not make sense in relation to the whole” (Sass, 1992, p. 214), and Stephens and Graham (2000) have further developed his proposal.”
• The sense of agency – a phenomenological consequence of enacting sensorimotor schemes (2017, background): “On one line of thought, for example, the sense of agency is presumed to derive from retrospective conceptual inference about one’s intentions and observed events (Stephens and Graham 2000; Wegner and Wheatley 1999; Alsmith 2015).”
• Operational Architectonics of the Human Brain Biopotential Field: Towards Solving the Mind-Brain Problem (2001, background): “Individuals experiencing the thought disorder known as thought-insertion have strong beliefs about their own thoughts, but attribute their thinking to aliens (Stephens and Graham, 2000).”
• Alien voices and inner dialogue: towards a developmental account of auditory verbal hallucinations (2004, background): “Firstly, they avoid getting caught up on the issue of the ‘intendedness’ of inner speech utterances, as discussed by Stephens and Graham (2000) and Akins and Dennett (1986) in relation to Hoffman’s (1986) model.”
• The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception (2007, background): “…since they may have some kind of trouble with predictive coding (with the detection of error signals and/or the formation and updating of generative models), the hypotheses that create the globally smallest error signal are in fact very bad hypotheses polluted with much internally generated noise.”
• Technology and the Body: the (Im)Possibilities of Re-embodiment (2011, background): “I will not go into the mechanisms of ownership of thoughts (cf. e.g. Campbell 1999, 2004), or into the dysfunctions of cognition that follow upon or accompany the breakdown of the feeling of ownership of thoughts (Stephens and Graham 2000).”