Earnings Management Response to Debt Covenant Violations and Debt Restructuring

By B. Jaggi, Picheng Lee. 2002

276 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2cc38d69b59b8bb617016b312d5d7fc8061a806c

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Citations in the corpus

The Impact of Leverage on Real Earnings Management (2013, background): “In addition, the positive association between leverage and EM is also supported by the reason of financial distress theory (Jaggi and Lee, 2002 and Fung and Goodwin, 2013) and to avoid debt covenant violations reasons (Dichev and Skinner, 2002 and Beatty and Weber, 2003).”
Earnings Management: An Analysis of Opportunistic Behaviour, Monitoring Mechanism and Financial Distress (2015, background): “Jaggi & Lee (2002) argue that the use of different accrual models will reduce errors in calculating discretionary accruals.”
The effect of financial leverage on real and accrual-based earnings management (2017, background): “9 suggests that firms engage in income-increasing EM to reduce the possibility of contractual violations (Defond and Jiambalvo 1994, Sweeney 1994, Jaggi and Lee 2002, Beatty and Weber 2003), which is followed, though, by downward earnings management during debt renegotiations (Mohd Saleh and Admed 2”
Factors influencing the disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions in companies world‐wide (2009, result): “…influence of agency theory, several studies have found a positive effect of leverage on the amount of information revealed voluntarily (for example, Jaggi and Lee, 2002; Xiao et al., 2004; Prencipe, 2004), whereas other works do not find a statistically significant relationship (Oyelere et al.,…”
Female CEOs and Core Earnings Quality: New Evidence on the Ethics Versus Risk-Aversion Puzzle (2018, unknown): “1994; Jaggi and Lee 2002; Peltier-Rivest 1999; Saleh and Ahmed 2005).”
Earnings Management in Family Firms: Evidence From R&D Cost Capitalization in Italy (2008, background): “The debtcovenant motivation (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Jaggi & Lee, 2002; Sweeney, 1994; Watts & Zimmermann, 1986) suggests that managers have the incentive to manage earnings to avoid violating covenants in debt contracts, which are typically stated in terms of accounting numbers or ratios.”
The impact of SME’s pre-bankruptcy financial distress on earnings management tools (2015, background): “Indeed, bankrupt companiesmanipulate earnings upwards in comparison with healthy firms (Campa & Camacho-Miñano, 2014; Rosner, 2003) and, in some cases, entities do that to ‘clean’ the negative signals of financial distress (Iatridis & Kadorinis, 2009; Jaggi & Lee, 2002; Sweeney, 1994).”