Internal Control vs External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion

By Kong‐Pin Chen, C. Chu. 2002

345 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2bcd6eb6a500a19063328a719296d28665421283

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Citations in the corpus

Why Can Modern Governments Tax so Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries (2016, background): “Chen and Chu (2005) show that the evasion decision of the firm’s owner affects the optimal compensation scheme offered to employees and hence creates a distortion in the manager’s effort and reduces the efficiency of the contract.”
A review of tax research (2010, neutral): “We use the Chen et al. (2010) paper discussed above as an example.”
The Incentives for Tax Planning (2012, background): “In addition, it is difficult to contract on tax evasion, since the behavior is illegal and therefore would render any contract that is a function of this outcome unenforceable by the courts (Chen and Chu, 2005).”
Home Country Tax System Characteristics and Corporate Tax Avoidance: International Evidence (2012, background): “Chen and Chu (2005) and Crocker and Slemrod (2005) both develop formal principal-agent models of illegal corporate tax evasion when the principal (owner) is risk-neutral and the agent (manager) is risk-averse.”
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value (2009, neutral): “In contrast, despite the differences between the individual and corporate contexts stressed by Slemrod (2004), there has been relatively little theoretical modeling of tax compliance decisions by corporations, although some recent papers (Chen and Chu, 2005; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005) analyze the na”
The Impact of Corruption on Firm Tax Compliance in Transition Economies: Whom Do You Trust? (2013, background): “The few studies on organizational (firm) income tax evasion have typically focused on economic influences of compliance behavior, such as the penalty structure and other means of enforcement (e.g., Crocker and Slemod, 2005; Chen and Chu, 2005; Bayer and Cowell, 2009).”
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm-Level Analysis (2011, methodology): “First, consistent with Chen et al. (2001), we find that the coefficient of DTURN is”
Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance (2015, background): “Slemrod (2004), Crocker and Slemrod (2005), and Chen and Chu (2005) suggest that corporate tax noncompliance (i.”