Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard : Evidence from Germany

By Lammertjan Dam, M. Koetter. 2012

371 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2b8b7319deae7db8770888439d76573fa1c51a25

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Citations in the corpus

Did TARP Banks Get Competitive Advantages? (2015, background): “…government interventions in other nations on bank risk taking, lending, and liquidity creation (e.g., Brandao-Marques, Correa, and Sapriza (2013), Dam and Koetter (2012), and Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck (2015)) and finds either reductions or increases in risk taking, and reductions in…”
Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting the Market Power-Risk Nexus (2013, neutral): “Support measures are either exits through restructuring mergers ordered by the Federal Supervision Authorities (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht—BaFin) or capital injections by bank pillar-specific insurance schemes (Dam and Koetter, 2012).”
Systemic Risk in Financial Networks: A Survey (2020, positive): “There is evidence that this matters as, for instance, Dam & Koetter (2012) find that bailouts led German banks to take on more risk.”
Did Saving Wall Street Really Save Main Street? The Real Effects of TARP on Local Economic Conditions (2015, background): “…a related literature that looks at the effects of government bailouts in other nations on bank risk taking, lending, and liquidity creation (e.g., Dam and Koetter (2012), Hryckiewicz (2012), Brandao-Marques, Correa, and Sapriza (2013), and Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck (2016)) and find…”
Borrowers under water! Rare disasters, regional banks, and recovery lending (2020, background): “…banking studies that consider the (cross-border) transmission of financial shocks (Puri et al., 2011), additional risk taking due to bailouts by regional insurance schemes (Dam and Koetter, 2012), or loan supply effects due to social ties between bankers and local politicians (Behn et al., 2013).”
Political Institutions and Bank Risk-Taking Behavior (2015, neutral): “Third, this work also complements to recent studies which argue that prevailing political factors influence the probability that government will bailout the banks if needed (Dam & Koetter 2012; Cukierman 2013; Antzoulatos & Tsoumas 2014).”