The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays

By F. P. Ramsey. 2001

964 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Geometry and Topology, Mathematical Physics, Theoretical Computer Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2b5ea665753a49a25b365f0f8a23c342b7d0c4ba

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In Geometry and Topology

In Mathematical Physics

In Theoretical Computer Science

Citations in the corpus

A penny for your thoughts: a survey of methods for eliciting beliefs (2014, positive): “This practice stems from the old idea that appropriately designed bets give the decision maker an incentive to report subjective beliefs truthfully (Ramsey 1926).”
Subjective Expected Utility With Incomplete Preferences (2013, background): “A different approach to the definition of subjective probabilities, properly described as choice-based or behavioral, was pioneered by Ramsey (1931) and de Finetti (1937) and culminated in the seminal theories of Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963).”
On Conditionals (2015, methodology): “[12,13,16,19,20,24,25,27,28,30] in that it also considers conditionals whose conditions are unknown and evaluates them by applying revision and abduction in order to satisfy them.”
Epistemic Relativism (2004, background): “In line with (4) and (6), it is rational to retain our worldview as well as the ordinary epistemic standard unless we come to have good grounds to stop.11 This consequence aligns our view with pragmatism (Peirce 1877) and reliabilism (Ramsey 1931, Armstrong 1973, Goldman 1979).”
Subjective expected utility theory without states of the world (2006, positive): “In such case the probabilities that figure in Theorem 1 represent the decision maker's beliefs in the sense of Ramsey (1931).”
The philosophy of Bayes’ factors and the quantification of statistical evidence (2016, background): “Fortunately there are very convincing arguments for capturing beliefs about hypotheses in terms of probability assignments over an algebra (Cox, 1946; de Finetti, 1995; Joyce, 1998; Ramsey, 1931).”
Loss Aversion Under Prospect Theory: A Parameter-Free Measurement (2007, background): “Such events can be interpreted as a generalization of Ramsey (1931) “ethically neutral events,” i.e. events with subjective probability 0.5 under expected utility, to prospect theory.”