Anti-herding and strategic consultation

By Gilat Levy. 2004

144 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2aeb13f3f46707a8f4c68ccf78d2c8c3b30b9e3e

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In Management Science and Operations Research

In Safety Research

Citations in the corpus

Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model (2010, background): “…problems discussed in the recent literature on strategic consultants (see, for instance, Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, Prendergast and Stole, 1996, Levy, 2004), and ask a simpler question: how should the decision maker and her consultants work together to obtain the most rational decision (for…”
Reputational cheap talk (2006, methodology): “28See also Avery and Chevalier (1999) and Levy (2004).”
Careerist judges and the appeals process (2005, background): “In other contexts, several articles, such as Levy (2004), Trueman (1994), and Avery and Chevalier (1999), analyzed the behavior of careerist experts and showed that experts may behave inefficiently by excessively contradicting prior information.”
How Do Auditors Weight Informal Contrary Advice? The Joint Influence of Advisor Social Bond and Advice Justifiability (2013, unknown): “2 Relative to informal advice, formal consultation is more likely to be documented or billed to the engagement and is less likely to involve auditor discretion in advisor selection and whether to follow the advice (Perkins 2003). For a survey of audit firms’ formal consultation practices, see Salter”
Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules (2007, background): “¤ Proof of Proposition 1: See Levy (2004).”
Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies (2009, background): “5See, for instance, Prendergast and Stole (1996), Levy (2004), Fingleton and Raith (2005) and Prat (2005).”
Transparency and deliberation within the FOMC: a computational linguistics approach (2014, background): “On the other hand, Levy (2007) has shown that transparency leads committee members who know their expertise to take contrarian actions more often.”