False Data Injection Attacks in Electricity Markets

By Le Xie, Yilin Mo, Bruno Sinopoli. 2010 First IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, 2010

410 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Control and Systems Engineering, Electrical and Electronic Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2a7f77384a45dc8ac86faa265f92a5b3c1d048da

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Citations in the corpus

Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey (2017, background): “It is also possible to inject the network with bogus packets that aim to ﬂood it, resulting in a DoS attack; or to inject false information, resulting in decisions based on false information [145], [164].”
Integrity Data Attacks in Power Market Operations (2011, background): “While most literature focus on the physical impact of cyber attacks to the power system, the potential financial risks of such a class of cyber attack are not well understood yet [13].”
Attack models and scenarios for networked control systems (2012, background): “The consequences of these attacks have also been analyzed in [18, 19].”
Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges (2013, background): “Targeted systems Impact References DC SCADA Invalid state estimation [39] [41] [43] [40] AC SCADA Invalid state estimation [42] [52] [59] Electric market Potential financial losses [58] [57] be authenticated to the communication networks or the grid, and have the access to sensitive information.”
False Data Injection on State Estimation in Power Systems—Attacks, Impacts, and Defense: A Survey (2017, background): “[36], [37] show that the adversary can launch FDI attacks for continuous financial arbitrage, e.”
Detecting False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid by Sparse Optimization (2014, background): “[6], [7] demonstrated that false data injection attacks are able to circumvent the bad data identification techniques equipped in an EMS, and could lead to congestion of transmission lines as well as profitable financial misconduct in the power market.”
On the Performance Analysis of Resilient Networked Control Systems Under Replay Attacks (2013, background): “Regarding attack detection, a particular class of cyber attacks, namely false data injection, against state estimation is studied in [26], [29], [30].”
A Review of False Data Injection Attacks Against Modern Power Systems (2017, methodology): “References [26] and [27] develop a heuristic-based method for the attacker to improve the attack efficiency.”
A novel method to detect bad data injection attack in smart grid (2013, background): “However, recent works demonstrate that an adversary, armed with the knowledge of the power system configurations, can accomplish bad data injection attack against state estimation without being detected [2]-[5].”
Smart Grid — The New and Improved Power Grid: A Survey (2012, neutral): “[261] also showed that with the knowledge of the system configuration, such attacks will circumvent the bad-data measurement detections in present SCADA systems, and may lead to profitable financial misconduct.”
False data injection attacks with incomplete information against smart power grids (2012, background): “, those in [3], [5], are no longer applicable and the attack is no longer guaranteed to pass the residue test in Section II-B.”
Attacks against process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response (2011, background): “Notable exceptions are the study of false data-injection attacks to state estimation in power grids [40–45], and electricity markets [46].”
Vulnerability Assessment of AC State Estimation With Respect to False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks (2012, background): “Hence, an attacker who maliciously wants to do harm to the electric power system, may attack either the physical system or the cyber system.”
Secure Control Systems: A Quantitative Risk Management Approach (2015, background): “For electric power networks, false-data injection attacks have been analyzed in detail in terms of vulnerability quantification [15], attack impact [16], [17], detection schemes [18], and attack evaluation on a realistic test bed [8].”
A Survey on the Detection Algorithms for False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids (2020, background): “Authors of [35] examine the effect of FDIA on electricity market.”
Cyber Security and Privacy Issues in Smart Grids (2012, background): “Papers [54]–[59] studied stealthy false-data attacks against state estimators located in control”
SWaT: a water treatment testbed for research and training on ICS security (2016, methodology): “However, many of the published algorithms are assessed for their effectiveness using simulation or numerically [2], [4], [6], [15], [16] This paper describes an operational ICS, the Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) testbed.”