The concept of mind.
By G. Ryle. The International journal of psycho-analysis, 2004
4,198 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2912b86d93ffa35d0fd665de99768aa313bfcf68
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Lisa Feldman Barrett
- James J. Gross
- Kevin N. Ochsner
- Henk Aarts
- Peter Carruthers
- Ruud Custers
- Jean Decety
- Jamil Zaki
Citations in the corpus
- The experience of emotion. (2007, background): “To conflate these different levels of analysis would be to make what Ryle (2000) called a category error.”
- How Learning about Scientists' Struggles Influences Students' Interest and Learning in Physics (2012, background): “This type of knowing is different from knowing that and knowing how (Ryle, 1949).”
- Building a translation competence model (2003, background): “…and Dreyfus (1986), Lesgold and Glaser (1989), Pozo and Postigo (1993), Pozo (1996), Ellis (1997), Puente Ferreras (1998), etc. 5 This distinction is based on the difference established by Ryle (1949) between knowing what and knowing how, i.e. the procedures by which this knowledge is acquired.”
- Naturalizing Subjective Character (2005, background): “Functionalist accounts of subjective character can be found in recent work by Shoemaker (1996) and Carruthers (2000, ch.”
- HOW MANY SEPARATELY EVOLVED EMOTIONAL BEASTIES LIVE WITHIN US (2002, background): “For instance there are also dispositions to produce new mental states (as noted in (Ryle, 1949)).”
- Information, Perception, and Action: What Should Ecological Psychologists Learn From Milner and Goodale (1995)? (2000, background): “From this perspective, it is a category mistake (Ryle, 1949) to speak of the coupling of perception and action; two things cannot couple if one is part of the other.”
- Academic integrity in action research (2012, background): “Other forms of knowledge such as tacit (Polanyi, 1966/1983) and ‘Knowing how’ (Ryle, 1949/1984) are important in everyone’s lives, but these categories of knowledge are separate from the scientific body of knowledge.”
- The neuropsychology of human memory. (1982, background): “During development, where synaptic reorganization has been best studied, growth and elimination of synaptic elements appear to follow a principle of competition, whereby loss of elements leads to an increase in innervation by surviving elements (Purves & Lichtman 1980).”
- Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution (2002, background): “However, within the theoretical discourse of the time, the alternative was thinking of language as an ability, a “knowing how” in the sense of Ryle (1949), which carried overtones of behaviorism and stimulus-response learning, a sense from which Chomsky with good reason wished to distance himself.”
- Rethinking the Development of “Nonbasic” Emotions: A Critical Review of Existing Theories☆ (2001, background): “of Stern (1985), and the representational self of Emde (1983) (e.”
- Universities as centres of non-learning (2008, methodology): “Trigwell and Shale (2004) cite Ryle (1949), who proposed that the most meaningful measure of a person’s understanding of a concept is what that person is able to do with it.”
- Doing Case Study: Abduction Not Induction, Phronesis Not Theory (2010, background): “Ryle (1990) suggested that these expectations and procedures enabled the issue of what he called “inference tickets” concerning the warrant of the generalization (pp. 117).”
- A Dispositional Approach to Attitudes: Thinking Outside of the Belief Box (2013, background): “It is to tend to expect them to make worthwhile colloquium comments, to seek 1 See critiques of the warehouse model of memory in Bartlett 1932; Neisser 1967; Roediger 1980; and Sutton 2008; and my critique of such models in developmental psychology in Schwitzgebel 1999 and McGeer and Schwitzgebel 20”