Effects of Unemployment Insurance Work-Search Requirements: The Maryland Experiment

By D. Klepinger, Terry R. Johnson, J. Joesch. 2002

120 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Social Experiments in the Labor Market (2016, unknown): “There is mixed evidence as to whether the verification requirement alone matters: The experiments discussed in Ashenfelter et al. (2004) indicate no effects, while a Maryland study summarized in Klepinger, Johnson, and Joesch (2002) did.”
Counseling and Monitoring of Unemployed Workers: Theory and Evidence from a Controlled Social Experiment (2001, unknown): “See Klepinger et al. (2002) for additional evidence.”
How Effective are Unemployment Benefit Sanctions? Looking Beyond Unemployment Exit (2009, methodology): “Third, the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is more comprehensively estimated in this paper than in Lalive et al. (2005). Finally, endogenous selection of the exits into E and NE is explicitly taken into account in this study by modeling the exit to NE process, thereby allowing for correlate”
Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market (2011, background): “One study that seems to come close is Klepinger et al. (2002) which investigates the effect of Maryland doubling the number of required employer contacts from 2 to 4.”