Redistribution in a Decentralized Economy: Growth and Inflation in China under Reform
By L. Brandt, Xiaodong Zhu. Journal of Political Economy, 2000
260 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2830e0e01a9acf2d72c9088d6d229a58df7c78e4
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Citations in the corpus
- Risks in China's Financial System (2018, unknown): “In the 1980s and 1990s, non-performing loans were typically absorbed by money creation that led to chronic high inflation (Brandt and Zhu, 2000).”
- Reserve requirements and optimal Chinese stabilization policy (2017, background): “For example, Brandt and Zhu (2000) examine the implications of commitment by the Chinese government for maintaining employment in its less efficient state sector.”
- China's Embrace of Globalization (2006, background): “For one theory-based analysis of the macroeconomic instability of the reform period, see Brandt and Zhu (2000).”
- Factor Market Distortions Across Time, Space and Sectors in China (2011, methodology): “A credit plan continued to be used to ensure access to new loans by state-owned firms (Brandt and Zhu, 2000), the effects of which were reinforced by barriers to the flow of capital across regions (Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005; Dollar and Wei, 2007).”
- Financial development, bank discrimination and trade credit (2007, background): “For example, Brandt and Zhu (2000) showed that the Chinese government supported inefficient state enterprises through cheap bank credits.”
- China's Great Economic Transformation: China's Financial System: Past, Present, and Future (2007, unknown): “Researchers have argued that the imbalance between loans made to the State Sector and the Hybrid Sector reflects the government’s policies of wealth transfer from the Hybrid Sector to the State Sector via state-owned banks, among other channels (Brandt and Zhu 2000).”
- China’s Financial System: Opportunities and Challenges (2011, unknown): “Researchers have argued that the imbalance between loans made to the State Sector and the Hybrid Sector reflects the government’s policies of wealth transfer from the Hybrid Sector to the State Sector via state-owned banks (e.g., Brandt and Zhu 2000).”
- Understanding China's Growth: Past, Present, and Future (2012, background): “Nonperforming loans in the state banking system increased rapidly, and the creation of money to make these loans was leading to chronic high infl ation (Brandt and Zhu 2000).”
- Can corporatization improve the performance of state-owned enterprises even without privatization? (2005, background): “This so-called bsoft budget constraintQ problem is well documented and analyzed in the literature (e.g., Qian and Roland, 1996; Brandt and Zhu, 2000; Cull and Xu, 2003).”
- Soft budget constraints, social burdens, and labor redundancy in China's state industry (2003, unknown): “JEL classification: H2; H4; J2; J3; P3 Keywords: Soft budget constraints; Labor redundancy; China; State-owned enterprise”
- Comparing the performance of Chinese banks: A principal component approach ☆ (2007, background): “First, poor banking performance might simply be the product of the government's obligation to keep SOEs alive for social stability reason (Brandt and Zhu 2000; Huang and Bonin 2001; Lardy 1998; Pei 1998).”