The impact of board composition and family ownership on audit committee formation: Evidence from Hong Kong
By Gerald Chau, P. Leung. 2006
138 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/27e66f168c49c2361f37d404af86e5579a395cea
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In Accounting
- K. Hussainey
- Sherif El-Halaby
- Khaled Samaha
- N. Subramaniam
- Khaled Dahawy
- Jian Zhang
- P. Stapleton
- L. McManus
Citations in the corpus
- An empirical analysis of corporate governance structures and voluntary corporate disclosure in volatile capital markets: the Egyptian experience (2011, background): “The presence of a higher proportion of non-executive directors on corporate boards should result in more effective monitoring of managerial opportunism (Chau and Leung, 2006; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Leftwich et al., 1981; Weir and Laing, 2003).”
- Corporate governance, firm characteristics and risk management committee formation in Australian companies (2009, background): “For example, Chau and Leung (2006) based on data from 397 publicly traded firms in Hong Kong found a positive association between the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the corporate board and audit committee existence.”
- Determinants of compliance with AAOIFI standards by Islamic banks (2016, background): “Chau and Leung (2006) suggested that independent directors will increase the quality of monitoring over management, because “they are not affiliated with the company as officers or employees, and thus are independent representatives of the shareholders’ interests” (Pincus et al., 1989, p.246).”
- The extent of corporate governance disclosure and its determinants in a developing market: The case of Egypt (2012, background): “Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983), and more recently Chau and Leung (2006) and Weir and Laing (2003) suggest that boards with a higher proportion of outside or independent directors will increase the quality of monitoring over management, because “ they are not af fi liated with the company as…”